While we blame the Japanese for the deaths and destruction (and yes, they were the instruments of that death and destruction), I put equal blame on the US Army and US Navy.
US wargaming in the 1930s had shown that Billy Mitchell was right and that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to an attack. But in spite of that, the Navy brass insisted that they (US Navy) could not conduct an undetected strike across thousands of miles of the Pacific, and therefore, neither could the Japanese.
The Navy insisted that the waters of Pearl Harbor were too shallow for torpedo attacks. The Japanese made changes they needed to make torpedo attacks highly successful.
The Army commander in Hawaii insisted that the real threat to the airfields was from Japanese-Americans, not an aerial attack.
The US forces were supposed to be on a “War Alert” status, but that sure did not seem to be the actual situation.
The Navy and Army spent more time before the war fighting with each other than preparing to fight a real war. They did not share intelligence well at all. There was no center for evaluating all intelligence — except FDR, who loved to get intel reports. But he was one man, and there was not much in the way of deciding what was real, and what wasn’t, nor to evaluate significance. Some cooperation between the services would have been very helpful.
Most of those who died on Dec 7 did so because of the failures of the US military to make realistic assessments.
I will say though, that the experience was taken to heart by the US military. I listened to talks by senior officers speaking of the need to avoid “a Pearl Harbor in Space.” Not loss of people, but loss of warfighting ability.
On a visit to Hickam AFB, I noticed that the building I had just been in had some peculiar markings, that looked like someone had tried to drill. I then realized that they were holes from 20mm cannon shells from Japanese strafing. A constant reminder for the need of informed vigilance.
While we blame the Japanese for the deaths and destruction (and yes, they were the instruments of that death and destruction), I put equal blame on the US Army and US Navy.
US wargaming in the 1930s had shown that Billy Mitchell was right and that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to an attack. But in spite of that, the Navy brass insisted that they (US Navy) could not conduct an undetected strike across thousands of miles of the Pacific, and therefore, neither could the Japanese.
The Navy insisted that the waters of Pearl Harbor were too shallow for torpedo attacks. The Japanese made changes they needed to make torpedo attacks highly successful.
The Army commander in Hawaii insisted that the real threat to the airfields was from Japanese-Americans, not an aerial attack.
The US forces were supposed to be on a “War Alert” status, but that sure did not seem to be the actual situation.
The Navy and Army spent more time before the war fighting with each other than preparing to fight a real war. They did not share intelligence well at all. There was no center for evaluating all intelligence — except FDR, who loved to get intel reports. But he was one man, and there was not much in the way of deciding what was real, and what wasn’t, nor to evaluate significance. Some cooperation between the services would have been very helpful.
Most of those who died on Dec 7 did so because of the failures of the US military to make realistic assessments.
I will say though, that the experience was taken to heart by the US military. I listened to talks by senior officers speaking of the need to avoid “a Pearl Harbor in Space.” Not loss of people, but loss of warfighting ability.
On a visit to Hickam AFB, I noticed that the building I had just been in had some peculiar markings, that looked like someone had tried to drill. I then realized that they were holes from 20mm cannon shells from Japanese strafing. A constant reminder for the need of informed vigilance.